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5.9  The Tunbs and Abu Musa Dispute

On the 30 November 1971, a day before the termination of the treaty with Ras Al Khaimah, Iran occupied the uninhabited Lesser Tunb Island and captured the Greater Tunb Island after some fighting. Britain also aided Iran to secure part possession of the island of Abu Musa from Sharjah in return for an annual grant. Iran added these three islands to the three it already possessed, Hormuz, Qeshm and Larak to control the six islands to the west and north of the Strait of Hormuz. One of the orginal architects of the existing structure, the former Iranian diplomat and exiled opposition leader, Dr Assad Homayoun wrote the following paper which although subjective does outline the dispute in recent years:

 

The three strategic islands of Greater Tumb, Lesser Tumb and Abu Musa - straddling the globally vital oil shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf - were under Iranian sovereignty from ancient times until 1887. In that year, the British, under the pretext of creating security in the Persian Gulf by fighting pirates, and to take advantage of the weak state of the Iranian government of the day, took over the three islands. Later, Britain transferred their control to the Trucial States, the predecessor of today’s United Arab Emirates (UAE). Successive Iranian Governments continuously protested and discussed the matter with the British Government, but without results.

The nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by Iran’s nationalist premier Dr Mohammad Mossadegh in 1952, and the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, created a tremendous political and economic setback for the British Government, the result of which was their eventual decision to withdraw from the region. In 1967, the British pulled out of the Aden Protectorate (later the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, later part of the Yemen Republic), and in 1968 declared their intent to withdraw from the Persian Gulf by 1971.

The Iranian Government, at this point, saw the opportunity to re-start its discussions with the British Government regarding the question of the sovereignty of the three Persian Gulf islands.

The discussions began in London, between Iranian Ambassador Afshar (the Shah’s envoy) and Sir William Luce, the British Ambassador to the Persian Gulf. In Tehran, talks began between top Iranian official Assadollah Alam (Minister of Court) and British Ambassador to Iran Sir Dennis Wright. Iran’s Foreign Minister at the time, Ardeshir Zahedi (later ambassador to the United States), appointed a task force of three diplomats - including this writer - to research and study the historic documents and maps, in order to update the documentation supporting Iranian sovereignty over these islands. Iran’s claim was based on historical facts, as well as geopolitical considerations of the Persian Gulf.

The sovereignty issue was the subject of talks between the two governments from 1968 until the end of 1970. At the same time, the future of Bahrain, over which Iran also claimed historic sovereignty, was also being determined. Although Iran sought a package deal in which it would relinquish its claims over Bahrain in return for the re-establishment of its sovereignty over the three islands in question, no explicit quid pro quo agreement was reached. Nevertheless, it was the Iranian Government’s understanding that, in the wake of the goodwill created by the Bahrain settlement, the British would not actively oppose the Iranian claim over the islands, and might even bring their influence to bear on the rulers of Sharjah and Rasal-Khaimah (now both members of the UAE) on behalf of Iran’s claims.

Finally, with a secret memorandum of understanding between Iran, Sharjah and Britain, an agreement was reached over Abu Musa. The island would be administered jointly between Iran and Sharjah. Iran would control the island militarily, while the income from the offshore oil would be divided between Iran and Sharjah. At the same time, both parties declared that neither would relinquish its respective claim to the sovereignty of Abu Musa island.

On the matter of the Tumb islands, Iran and Ras al-Khaimah could not come to an agreement because the ruler of the emirate had demanded an exorbitant amount of money, which Iran was unwilling to pay.

Twenty-four hours before the expiration of the British Agreement with the Trucial States, and the UK’s withdrawal from the Persian Gulf - at 06.15 hrs on November 30, 1971 - the Iranian Navy and Marines staged the first hovercraft-borne amphibious assault in history, and occupied the three islands. Iran, after 80 years, exercised its sovereignty over its lost property.

This action by the late Shah’s Government was eventually accepted by all concerned, after much protest from some Arab quarters. Since it was understood that the then-Iranian Government had no aggressive intentions, and was itself an element for stability in the Persian Gulf, the issue subsided.

Now, because of the political behaviour and revolutionary attitude of the current clerical Government of Iran - which is at the same time trying to subvert the moderate governments in the Gulf region - the emirates involved have thought the time ripe to raise the issue once again. This does not bode well for the region as a whole. Since the clerical Administration of Iran is shaky, and will use all excuses and prospects of foreign adventures to legitimise its continued rule, the matter could well lead to confrontation between the UAE and Iran.

The Iran-Iraq conflict in the same way helped to perpetuate the dictatorial rule of the clerics. A new conflict would have a similar effect: the re-awakening of another old issue, the Iranian claim over Bahrain.

In conclusion, it should be stated that:

* (a) The three islands - Abu Musa and the two Tunbs - belong to Iran, based on historical facts;

* (b) The islands have, for the past 21 years, been under the sovereignty of Iran. The only time that the islands were not controlled by Iran was when the British had seized them by force, during a period when Iran was weak. The British did not have the legal right to transfer their colonial legacy to the UAE;

* (c) Iran must respect the agreements and memorandum reached over Abu Musa, and the matter must be resolved peacefully;

* (d) Iran must show goodwill towards its neighbours and contribute to the stability of the region, rather than export militant Islam.

Since it appears to be the inherent nature of the clerical Administration of Iran to pursue its militant course, it falls to the Iranian people and their defence forces to change their government. It is in the interest of the international community to support the Iranian people in their quest to bring moderate government to Iran, to deal with both domestic and international problems.”^[1]

 

Iran now began to fulfil its new role as guarantor of security and safety in the Gulf, a role agreed by both the US and Britain.

Iraq responded by breaking off relations with Tehran and London and turned towards Moscow formalising its close ties with the Soviets with a 15 year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in April 1972. British influence in Iraq which had emerged under a British mandate in 1921 had been strengthened in the Second World War and was confirmed in both Iran and Iraq with the Baghdad Pact, officially known as the Middle East Treaty Organisation, in February 1951. It was substantially eroded in March 1959 when Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact adopting a non-aligned policy and Iran moved closer to the US when it signed a Military Co-operation Agreement with Washington.

The Arab nationalists of Iraq were therefore in 1972 aligned with the Soviet Union and Iran with the US and even though diplomatic links were re-established between the two countries during the Arab-Israeli war in early October 1973, the relationship was poor. Boundary disputes especially in the Shatt al Arab waterway at the head of the Gulf, the Kurd problem in the north of both countries and the dominance in Iraq of the minority Sunnis over the Shias, 80 per cent of Iraqi population, continued to exacerbate relations. The Arab-Israeli accord of Camp David in September 1978 and the return to Iran of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini as the religious Shia leader a fortnight after the departure of the Shah in mid January 1979 increased the isolation of Iraq from the other Arab states. In April 1980 Saddam Hussein called on Iran to relinquish control of the islands of Abu Musa, Lesser Tunb and Greater Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz and continued his ruthless drive against the Shias in Iraq. In Iran on 24-25 April 1980 the US failed in its attempt to rescue its diplomats from the American Embassy and further attempts to overthrow Khomeini by pro-Shah forces also failed. Iran was now becoming isolated with an embargo by the Western nations and its virulent comments on the rulers of the Gulf States. Having secured the backing of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait clashes erupted between Iraqi and Iranian troops near Qasr-e Shirin on 2 September 1980. After further incidents and demands which it felt were not met Iraq invaded Iran on the 22 September 1980.

In October 1992, tension once again rose over the sovereignty of the islands of Abu Musa and the Tumbs as the government of the United Arab Emirates revived claims for the three islands which lie to the west of the Strait of Hormuz and straddle the shipping lanes.

In 1977 following the discovery of offshore oil deposits, Oman claimed a 16km stretch of the Ras al Khaimah coastline which was reportedly settled in 1979. With the ongoing conflict in Dhofar between the Oman government and PFLOAG, it was not surprising though alarming for the Soviet Union to declare their support for Ras al Khaimah in 1978.^[2]