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5.6  Events up to the first world war

At the turn of this century, Rear-Admiral Mahan regarded the Gulf as being of far more value to Britain than any Far Eastern possessions because it controlled India and the Indian Ocean, which after all meant controlling the way to every where else, and he saw Russia’s abysmal naval forage against Japan in 1904 as very much in Britain’s interest because it exhausted Russia’s surplus energy and ‘will withdraw her from the Gulf’.[1] Russia’s expansion in the Caspian Sea region had begun in 1804 and after two wars with Iran they had gained Georgia and other regions which were formally ceded by Iran in the Treaty of Turcomancai in 1828. Iran had ceased to be an effective military power in Asia and was unable to resist further British and Russian inroads. From 1840 the Russians  progressively occupied regions of Iran to the east of the Caspian Sea until in 1893 they reached the boundary that now exists. To the west of Iran remained the declining empire of the Ottomans which was to be split up between Britain, France and Russia under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916. Before then Iran turned her attention to the Persian Gulf and to maintain and extend her hold over the islands of Hormuz, Qeshm, Larak and Henjam. Russia had in the last few years of the 19th century looked towards the Persian Gulf as a possible site for a warm-water port. This prompted a direct response from Britain in the Curzon Declaration of 1902 that any such attempts would be forcibly resisted.

Lord George Curzon[2] as Viceroy of India sailed from India the next year ostensibly to visit the Arab states that were under British protection in the Persian Gulf region. Accompanied by his wife and entourage they visited the Elphinstone Inlet on their way from Muscat to Sharjah. Lady Curzon’s Persian Gulf Journal notes that they set sail for Muscat from Karachi on the 16 November 1903. The entry for the Friday 20 November 1903 states:

 

The morning after we left Muscat we reached Musandam and we cruised all day amongst islands and fjords of the most barren description. The land is uninhabited save for a few fishermen, and its main interest is a strategic one, as the bays and inlets afford anchorage for a fleet, and as the land is No Man’s Russia or France could take advantage of harbourage in the event of war. In 1867 England controlled the region by putting up a flag and a telegraph station, but the heat was so awful, and the isolation so great, that the poor signallers died and it was abandoned. In the afternoon the Viceroy and the Admiral went ashore to examine a particular spot for a cable station, and the Hardinge anchored in the most beautiful rock-bound inlet. At sunset we sailed out of the network of islands and pursued our way towards Sharjah. The fleet had been waiting for us outside, and we again formed a procession.[3]

 

As Mahan had stated the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 had revealed Russian weaknesses and a compromise was reached between Britain and Russia over Iran in the Treaty of 1907. Iran would be split into three zones of influence and effective control by the two powers. The Russians would take the north and the British in the south with a neutral zone between the two. The British zone extended from Bandar Abbas and Kerman in the west of Iran to Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the east. Another reason for the conclusion of the 1907 Treaty was the rise of an aggressive Germany and potential enemy of both Britain and Russia.

The island of Hormuz has large salt deposits which make any water on the island so saline as to be undrinkable and red iron oxide or haematite deposits which on certain parts of the coastline turn the sea to a deep red. Salt has been mined and exported from the island for some time. At the beginning of the 20th century the British firm of F. C. Strick and Company worked the iron oxide deposits on Hormuz island and exported 3,000 to 4,000 tons per year whilst the German firm of Wönckhaus worked on Abu Musa until the Anglo-German incident of 1907.[4]

Abu Musa was then under the jurisdiction of the Trucial Coast shaikhs and the mining concession held by three Arabs in the form of a grant. Wönckhaus seeing that Strick was making some profit on their mining in Hormuz turned his attention to Abu Musa. The British resident warned the shaikhs that they were not to conclude any arrangements with the German company without consulting him. However two of the three Arabs turned over the concession to Wönckhaus who was also involved in setting up German shipping lines in the Gulf that would be available for shipping the ore out. Cox, the British Resident pressed the shaikhs to cancel the concession but Wönckhaus ignored this and work continued. At this point British attention turned to the Russians who they regarded as a threat to their dominance in the Gulf as well as Iran. With the above  mentioned Anglo-Russian accord in place which maintained the status quo in the Gulf, the British turned their attention back to Wönckhaus and his continued presence on Abu Musa. Cox received approval to have the firm's workers removed by the Shaikh of Sharjah's men and on 22 October 1907, Lieutenant C. H. Gabriel, the Bandar Abbas British Agent arrived on the Lapwing with dhows containing the Shaikh's men. Some one hundred of Wönckhaus's workers were removed to Lingah, their huts levelled and thirty of the Shaikh's men left to guard the island. Wönckhaus's junior partner, Brown and some new workers attempted to land on Abu Musa but were refused permission by the Shaik's men who left two weeks later.

By now the matter had escalated to exchanges between London and Berlin and became an important diplomatic incident that continued past 1910 when the Germans suggested that it be referred to the Hague Tribunal. Arguments, claims and counter claims continued with the Germans pursuing it on a commercial basis whilst the British fearful of any political change in the Gulf countered in every way possible. By the outbreak of the war in 1914, the level of compensation to Wönckhaus was still in dispute and according to his own account in the end he received nothing.[5]

At the outbreak of war in 1914 Britain had quickly occupied the head of the Persian Gulf to

 

[1] #189 Mostert, Noel, Supership, Macmillan London Ltd, London, 1975 ~ p. 271.

[2] Curzon, George Nathaniel, Marquis Curzon of Kedleston, (1859-1925), British MP (1886), Under-Secretary for India (1891-2), Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1895), Viceroy of India (1898-1905), Lord Privy Seal (1915), Foreign Secretary (1919-24) #404 Lenman, Bruce P. & Boyd, Katherine (ed.), Dictionary of World History, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1994 ~  p. 248 and #434 Magnusson, Magnus (ed.), Chambers Biographical Dictionary, Chambers, Edinburgh, 1996 ~  pp. 374-5

[3] #129. Bradley, John. Lady Curzon’s India, Letters of a Vicereine. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985. ~ pp. 145-153

[4] #535 Issawi, Charles (ed.), The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1971 ~ p283

[5] #548 Busch, Briton Cooper, Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914, Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967 ~  pp. 353-72 contains a detailed account of the incidents between Britain and both Germany and Russia and is supported by extensive references to British government correspondence at the time. Further references for Strick: MacLean, H. W. Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia. UK Parliament, Accounts and Papers, 1904, 95 and for Wönckhaus: Litten, Wilhelm Persien Berlin 1920 and Issawi, Charles Economic History of the Middle East pp. 350-55